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Background: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a prospective risk assessment tool that has been widely
used within the aerospace and automotive industries and has been utilised within healthcare since the early 1990s.
The aim of this study was to explore the validity of FMEA outputs within a hospital setting in the United Kingdom.
Methods: Two multidisciplinary teams each conducted an FMEA for the use of vancomycin and gentamicin. Four
different validity tests were conducted:
 Face validity: by comparing the FMEA participants’ mapped processes with observational work.
 Content validity: by presenting the FMEA findings to other healthcare professionals.
 Criterion validity: by comparing the FMEA findings with data reported on the trust’s incident report database.
 Construct validity: by exploring the relevant mathematical theories involved in calculating the FMEA risk priority
number.
Results: Face validity was positive as the researcher documented the same processes of care as mapped by the
FMEA participants. However, other healthcare professionals identified potential failures missed by the FMEA teams.
Furthermore, the FMEA groups failed to include failures related to omitted doses; yet these were the failures most
commonly reported in the trust’s incident database. Calculating the RPN by multiplying severity, probability and
detectability scores was deemed invalid because it is based on calculations that breach the mathematical
properties of the scales used.
Conclusion: There are significant methodological challenges in validating FMEA. It is a useful tool to aid
multidisciplinary groups in mapping and understanding a process of care; however, the results of our study cast
doubt on its validity. FMEA teams are likely to need different sources of information, besides their personal
experience and knowledge, to identify potential failures. As for FMEA’s methodology for scoring failures, there were
discrepancies between the teams’ estimates and similar incidents reported on the trust’s incident database.
Furthermore, the concept of multiplying ordinal scales to prioritise failures is mathematically flawed. Until FMEA’s
validity is further explored, healthcare organisations should not solely depend on their FMEA results to prioritise
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There has been growing awareness that proactive or pro-
spective analysis methods, such as those that have been
used in other high hazard industries, provide additional
benefits for improving quality and safety in healthcare [1].
In the last few years, the most prominent proactive risk
assessment technique used within healthcare has been
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA).
FMEA is a prospective risk assessment tool designed
to promote patient safety by mapping out the process of
care, then identifying potential failures that may occur in
this process, in order to understand how and why errors
or failures occur. The FMEA process and steps are
briefly described in Table 1.
FMEA’s use in healthcare has been established during
the last decade, particularly in the USA, and has been
endorsed by a number of patient safety agencies such as
the Joint Commission, Institute for Healthcare Improve-
ment (IHI) and the Institute for Safe Medication Prac-
tices (ISMP). In the recent years, FMEA’s reliability has
been questioned and explored [5-7]; while the validity of
its use in healthcare has been questioned but not yet
assessed [7]. In this study, we wished to explore the
characteristics of FMEA by studying its validity.
Validity is concerned with the accuracy of data [8]; it is
an assessment of whether an instrument measures what it
aims to measure [9]. In science, validity is essential to a re-
search proposal’s theoretical framework, design and meth-
odology, including how well specific tools or instruments
measure what they are intended to measure [10].
The aim of this study was to explore the validity of the
FMEA outputs, and where appropriate the tool itself, by
four different methods including:
1. Face validity: Refers to the investigators’ or an expert
panel’s subjective assessment of the presentation and
relevance of the tool in question [9].
2. Content validity: Involves the judgment, usually by
an expert panel, about the extent to which theTable 1 FMEA steps [2-4]
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3. Criterion validity: Refers to the extent to which the
method correlates with other measures of the same
variable [11]. To demonstrate criterion validity, the
results are compared with established standard
methods of collecting the same information.
4. Construct validity: Carmines and Zeller [12] report
that construct validity is concerned with the extent
to which a particular measure relates to other
measures consistent with theoretically derived
hypotheses concerning the concepts that are being
measured, i.e. the validity seeks agreement between
a theoretical concept and a specific measuring
procedure or device.
Methods
In 2009, two multidisciplinary groups were recruited
from 2 large teaching hospitals within the same English
National Health Service (NHS) Trust, to conduct separ-
ate FMEAs in parallel on the prescribing, administering
and monitoring of vancomycin and gentamicin. The
groups followed the standard FMEA steps in Table 1.
Results of these two FMEAs have been published in de-
tail elsewhere [5].
Following the completion of these two FMEAs, the
validity of the FMEA’s output was explored in the same
two hospitals where the FMEA meetings took place [5].
Ethical approval was granted by the local Research Eth-
ics Committee before the start of the study.
The above validity tests were applied in the present
study as follows:
1. Face validity: This was taken to refer to the
researchers’ subjective assessment of the process of
vancomycin and gentamicin use, as mapped out by
the FMEA teams.
2. Content validity: This involved the judgment of
healthcare professionals who did not participate inents
pic is usually a high-risk process
EA team should be multidisciplinary.
fy the failures that can occur, their causes and effects.
done by multiplying the severity, probability and
tability scores (usually using 10-point scales, accompanied
itten descriptions for numerical scores.) Severity relates to
riousness of the injury or impact that could ultimately
if a failure occurs. The probability of occurrence is the
ood that something will happen. Detectability is the degree
ich something can be discovered or noticed, i.e. if this failure
s, how likely is it to be detected?
am makes recommendations to decrease or eliminate the risk of failures.
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which the outputs of the FMEA appeared to include
all the domains judged to be required.
3. Criterion validity: This involved assessing the extent
to which outputs of the vancomycin and gentamicin
FMEA correlated with other similar objective
measures.
4. Construct validity: A key theory underpinning
FMEA is to prioritise failures, and this is achieved by
calculating the RPN value. The mathematical
properties of the scoring scales used were therefore
assessed and their use in FMEA evaluated.
The first three tests explored the validity of the
FMEA’s ouputs, while construct validity related to the
FMEA tool itself.
Face validity
To explore the face validity of the FMEA outputs, obser-
vational work was carried out. A researcher (N.S) sha-
dowed a number of pharmacists on their daily clinical
pharmacy visits to medical and surgical wards for a
period of two weeks to observe use of vancomycin and
gentamicin in practice. Two days were also spent in the
microbiology and chemistry laboratories. Consultant
ward rounds were attended, and nurses observed prepar-
ing and administering vancomycin and gentamicin.
Other aspects of the process such as blood sampling
from patients, nurses receiving laboratory results on the
phone or doctors checking the computer systems for the
results of drug assays were not directly observed as they
occurred at unpredictable times during the day. Instead,
information about these steps was obtained through
conversations with the ward nurses and pharmacists.
The process maps created by the two FMEA teams were
then compared with the researcher’s observations.
Content validity
Initially 70 healthcare professionals, comprising senior
doctors, junior doctors, pharmacists, nurses, laboratory
personnel, service managers and risk managers had been
invited to participate in the FMEA meetings but only 14
actually participated [5]. The remaining 56 were con-
tacted again after the FMEA was completed and shown
the FMEA flow chart and the potential failures identi-
fied. They were invited to comment as to whether or not
they agreed with the mapped process and the potential
failures identified. E-mail reminders were sent once a
week for three weeks.
Criterion validity
Incidents involving the use of intravenous (IV) genta-
micin or vancomycin were retrieved from the trust’s
incident report database for the period January 2006to January 2009. Incidents that did not specifically
mention vancomycin or gentamicin or were related to
the use of these antibiotics in children and patients on
dialysis were excluded. Incidents involving the continu-
ous infusion of vancomycin, for example in the inten-
sive care unit, were also excluded because this dosing
regimen had been excluded from the FMEA
discussions.
Criterion validity was then explored using two
approaches. First, the failures identified by the FMEA
teams were listed together with their FMEA probability
scores. The corresponding incidents reported on the
hospital’s incident database were then listed. The
reported frequency of incidents similar to the FMEA
failures was determined for the three year period.
Second, the severity and the probability of recurrence
of the incidents reported on the database, as assessed by
the healthcare professionals reporting the incidents, and
the severity and probability scores of their corresponding
FMEA failures were tested for correlation using Spear-
man’s correlation.Construct validity
As the main theory behind FMEA is to prioritise fail-
ures, and this is achieved by calculating the RPN value,
the mathematical properties of the scoring scales used
were explored and their use in FMEA evaluated.Results
Face validity
To assess the face validity of FMEA, a flowchart for pre-
scribing, administering and monitoring vancomycin and
gentamicin developed by the researcher through obser-
vations was compared to the mapped processes prepared
by the FMEA teams [5]. The flowchart style developed
by the researcher included ‘yes’ and ‘no’ choices, while
the FMEA teams developed a simple event line and
included sub processes under each main step identified.
Other than this, the main difference between the flow-
charts mapped by the FMEA teams and that developed
by the researcher was the level of detail presented in the
FMEA flowchart. The teams identified more detailed
sub processes to help them list the failures more easily.
In spite of these differences, the main steps identified by
both FMEA teams were the same as those identified by
the researcher through observations on the ward. These
steps included prescribing, administering and monitor-
ing the use of vancomycin or gentamicin. Key issues
such as microbiological cultures and sensitivities, empir-
ical treatment and modifying treatment after levels
reported were also acknowledged by both FMEA teams
and by the researcher.
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Only four (7.5%) of the 56 healthcare professionals
agreed to comment about the FMEA, and only three
(5.4%) actually replied after three weeks of E-mail remin-
ders. All three respondents were medical consultants.
The consultants who reviewed the FMEA had a num-
ber of comments and additions to the completed FMEA
sheet. The first consultant did not have comments
regarding the FMEA results but instead questioned the
evidence behind the use of the scoring scales. On the other
hand, the second consultant commented on the sub pro-
cesses and failure identified, indicating that there were
important failures that the groups did not identify such
as checking for allergies and recording the patient’s
weight and age. Furthermore, this consultant disagreed
with some of the RPN scorings for some of the failures
and stated that some failures deserved a much higher
priority than others. Therefore, from the consultant’s
point of view, the RPN values of some failures may have
differed if she/he had participated in the FMEA meet-
ings. The third consultant was content with the FMEA
data provided and did not make any further comments.Criterion validity
In total, 52 incidents concerning vancomycin or genta-
micin were retrieved for the period January 2006 to
January 2009 but only 22 met the inclusion criteria for
analysis. Thirteen of the 22 (59%) reported incidents
were of types that had been identified by the FMEA
teams and were therefore compared to the FMEA fail-
ures. Of the remaining nine incidents the FMEA teams
had not identified, seven (78%) were related to omitted
doses and two (22%) reported that the wrong route for
the medication had been prescribed on the drug chart,
neither of which were failures identified by the FMEA
teams.
First the frequency of incident reporting was com-
pared to the probability scores assigned by the FMEA
teams to the same failures. There seemed to be little re-
lationship between how frequently failures were reported
in comparison to how often the team perceived that
these failures occurred (Figure 1).
Secondly, the severity and the probability of recur-
rence of the incidents reported on the database (as
assessed by the healthcare professionals reporting the
incidents), and the severity and probability scores of the
corresponding FMEA failures were compared. Figure 2
shows that the severity scores on the trust’s incident
reporting database were either ‘no harm’ or ‘minor
harm’, while for the FMEA failures, the lowest severity
score was two (for one failure) and the highest score was
an eight (= major injury; for three failures), with the ma-
jority of scores ranging between five and seven.As for the probability scores, Figure 3 shows that the
lowest probability score for the FMEA failures was three,
for two failures. All the remaining scores ranged be-
tween five (one occurrence every six months) and nine
(one occurrence every three to four days); and the only
failure given a probability of nine by the FMEA team
had an equivalent probability of ‘rare’ reported on trust’s
incident reporting database. Overall, the FMEA partici-
pants anticipated that the majority of failures would
occur again at least once a month (probability score of
eight), while the majority of similar incidents reported
on trust’s incident reporting database were considered
unlikely to recur, i.e expected to occur again annually.
The correlation between the FMEA severity and prob-
ability scores, and the trust’s incident reporting database
severity and probability scores was not significant (rs:
0.42 and rs: 0.77 respectively).
Construct validity
The RPN is calculated by multiplying three ordinal scales:
severity scores, probability scores and the detectability
scores. In an ordinal scale, the categories have an ordered
or ranked relationship relative to each other; however, the
amount of difference between ranks is not specified.
Mathematically, ordinal scales incorporate the relation-
ships of equivalence (=), ‘greater than (>)’ and ‘less than
(<)’ [13]. For example, a doctor might use a scale of 1–5
to indicate degree of improvement in some condition,
from 1 (no improvement) to 5 (complete cure). While we
know that a score of 4 is better than a score of 2, there is
no implication that 4 is ‘twice as good’ as 2. Nor is the im-
provement from 2 to 4 necessarily the same “amount” of
improvement as the improvement from, say, 1 to 3. All we
know is that there are 5 categories, with 2 being better
than 1 and 3 being better than 2.
Siegel [13] states that the intervals of an ordinal scale
are not identical to each other (as intervals on an ordinal
scale are determined subjectively and will differ with
each user), and thus ordinal scales cannot be subjected
to the numerical system known as arithmetic; in other
words ordinal numbers cannot meaningfully be multi-
plied or divided [14]. In FMEA however, the ordinal
scales of severity, probability and detectability are multi-
plied to produce the RPN, which breaches the mathem-
atical properties of the ordinal scales. Bowles [14]
highlights four main limitations of using the RPN in the
way that it is currently used in FMEA:
1. Holes in the scale: Many of the numbers in the range
of 1 to 1000 (assuming 10-point scoring scales are
used) cannot be formed from the product of severity,
probability and detectability. While it is true that
the numbers cover a range from 1 to 1000, 88% of
that range is empty with the first four possible
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Figure 1 Comparing FMEA probability scores.
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/12/150RPN values covering 0.4% of the scale, while the last
four values cover 20% of the scale. No number
having a prime factor greater than 10 can be formed.
Thus the numbers 11, 22, 33 or even 990, which are
all multiples of 11 cannot be formed and are
excluded. 1000 is the largest number, but 900 is the
second largest followed by 810, 800, 729 and 720. In
this case, can we say that the difference between 810
and 900 is the same or less than the difference
between 900 and 1000?2. Duplicate RPN values: Since 1000 numbers are
produced from the product of severity, probability
and detectability but only 120 of them are unique,
the majority of the RPN values can be formed by
several ways. For example, the RPN values of 60, 72
and 120 can each be formed from 24 different
combinations of severity, probability and
detectability scores.
Although the RPN values may be identical, their risk
implications may be different.
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Figure 2 Severity scores for incidents reported on the organisation’s incident reporting database and the equivalent FMEA failures
and their severity scores.
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scoring scale can lead to very different effects on
RPN, depending on the values of other factors. For
example (Table 2):
A 1 point change in the severity in the first example
causes a 64 point change in the RPN, whereas in the
second a 1 point change in severity causes only a 24
point change (Table 3).
4. Comparing the RPNs: Bowles [14] also argues that
comparing the RPN values is generally not possible
without incorporating some costs that quantify how
the reductions along one scoring scale (for example
the severity scores) relate to changes along the other
scoring scales (probability and detectability scores).
Discussion
In this study the validity of FMEA was explored by
assessing different types of validity for the FMEA. Four
different types of validity were assessed: face, content,
criterion and construct validity. No previous work has
formally explored the validity of FMEA outputs.
Face validity of the FMEA mapped outputs was posi-
tive as both groups included the main steps identified bythe researcher through observations. Content validity of
the FMEA was explored by presenting the FMEA find-
ings to other healthcare professionals. These healthcare
professionals identified other potential failures within
the process of vancomycin and gentamicin use. Further-
more, the FMEA groups failed to include failures related
to omitted doses, yet these were the failures most com-
monly reported in the trust’s incidents database. Testing
criterion validity of the FMEA was done by comparing
the FMEA findings with data reported on the trust’s in-
cident report database. The results showed no significant
correlation between the scores reported by the FMEA
team and those reported on the trust’s incidents data-
base as the FMEA team scored their severity and prob-
ability scores much higher than those on database.
Finally construct validity was assessed by exploring the
relevant mathematical theories involved in calculating
the risk priority number (RPN). Construct validity of
FMEA has been previously addressed in a number of en-
gineering articles, where the use of RPN has been criti-
cized [14,15]. These papers assessed construct validity
indirectly by exploring the relevant mathematical theor-
ies involved in calculating the RPN, which proved to be
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Figure 3 Probability scores for incidents reported on the organisation’s incident reporting database and the equivalent FMEA failures
and their severity scores.
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valid mathematical calculations that breach the proper-
ties of the scales used.
The study’s results indicate that the FMEA team must
be multidisciplinary in order to identify as many poten-
tial failures as possible; and yet the teams may need to
acknowledge that they might not be able to capture all
expected failures. As for criterion validity, FMEA partici-
pants had the tendency to overestimate the severity of
the effect of the failure in comparison to those reporting
the incidents on the database. This is perhaps due to the
fact that with the incident reporting database, the error
or failure is reported retrospectively; the healthcare pro-
fessional reporting the incident has witnessed the effect
of the error, if any, on the patient and thus the reported
severity score is based on the actual effect of the error
on the patient. While with FMEA, the failures identified
by the groups are identified as prospective failures, i.e.
potential failures. This perhaps made it difficult for the
FMEA team members to predict the likely effect of this
failure and thus in some cases the groups were perhapsTable 2 Example of RPN’s sensitivity to small changes
Severity Probability Detectability RPN
3 8 8 192
8 3 8 192presuming the worst effects of certain failures on the
patients concerned.Why is validity important?
Kirwan [16] reported that lack of evidence of validity
leads to two basic problems when using techniques such
as FMEA: firstly, there is scepticism as to whether the
techniques available have any empirical predictive valid-
ity, and secondly, technique developers and assessors get
little useful feedback on how to improve the technique’s
predictive accuracy and precision. Furthermore, relying
on invalid results to improve any process may lead to
unnecessary or inappropriate costly changes within an
organisation. Validation, therefore, is essential as a gen-
eral quality assurance process and to generate the ability
to fine-tune risk assessment techniques. Kirwan [16] fur-
ther explained that techniques that depend on significant
judgment either by assessors or experts may fail to ac-
curately quantify the risks. Therefore it is necessary that
objective tests are carried out to ensure validity of theseTable 3 Example of RPN’s sensitivity to small changes
Severity Probability Detectability RPN
4 8 8 256
9 3 8 216
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the risk assessment as a whole [17].
The purpose of FMEA is to estimate the risk of poten-
tial failures and prioritise the failures that require the
most attention, whether this is because they are assumed
to be the most severe, the most probable or the least de-
tectable failures or a combination of these. Thus if pa-
tient safety becomes reliant on such a technique then it
is essential to ensure the results produced are consistent
and accurate, irrespective of the team using the tool, es-
pecially since FMEA entails a lot of time, effort and
resources.
Healthcare FMEA (HFMEA)
In 2001, the USA’s Veteran’s Administration (VA) Na-
tional Centre for Patient Safety (NCPS) [3] specifically
designed the Healthcare FMEA (HFMEA) tool for risk
assessment in the healthcare field. HFMEA and FMEA
have similarities at their core, but deal with detectability
differently, and HFMEA uses 4-point scales instead of
10-point. They both involve the same 5 basic steps
(Table 1). The main difference between them lies in the
scoring step; HFMEA detectability scores are only deter-
mined if the failure identified warrants further action, as
determined by a decision tree.
Although HFMEA was not formally evaluated in this
study, it is assumed that at least some of the problems
inherent within FMEA will also be present in HFMEA
and will also affect the reliability and validity of
HFMEA’s results.
Limitations
There were two main limitations to our work: First,
when exploring the content validity only three consul-
tants were able to provide feedback on the completed
FMEA although reminders to all 56 potential respon-
dents were sent out each week for three consecutive
weeks. The low response rate could potentially be attrib-
uted to two main issues; either healthcare providers con-
tacted may never have heard about FMEA and thus
were not interested to ‘learn’ about a new tool and then
criticise it, or they were familiar with FMEA but it was
perceived as being too time consuming for them to go
through the entire FMEA worksheet and make com-
ments. Second, comparing the FMEA failures with inci-
dents reported on the trust’s reporting database proved
to be a challenge because reporting databases are known
to capture a small proportion of incidents. In a recent
comparison between reporting systems and systematic
review of records, the reporting systems detected only
about 6% of the adverse events found by systematic re-
view of records [18]. Nurses estimate that only between
25% and 63% of medication errors are actually reported
[19,20]; while a study by Franklin et al. [21] found thatspontaneous reporting identified only 1% of all prescrib-
ing errors.
Implications
Improving the content validity of the FMEA outputs
maybe achieved by allowing the FMEA teams to use
other sources, besides their experience and knowledge,
such as hospital audits or incident report databases, to
list as many potential failures as possible. However, the
main limitation of FMEA would still be the use of nu-
merical values to subjectively rank these potential fail-
ures. In addition to this, it would be impractical,
expensive and very time consuming to collect objective
data for each potential failure identified. Thus the appeal
of FMEA as a simple prospective generic tool would not
be realised.
In addition to this, when healthcare organisations de-
cide to conduct an FMEA, participating teams must be
aware that the conclusions of FMEA are usually short
lived, particularly in healthcare. As new evidence-based
medicine continues to evolve and guidelines and proto-
cols continue to be periodically updated, along with the
introduction of new technologies such as electronic pre-
scribing, clinical decision support or bar-coding, a given
set of FMEA results will only be valid for a limited time
period and should therefore be updated regularly. Fur-
thermore, the policy of doctors ‘turnover’ or rotations
within different hospitals (as within the National Health
System in the UK) should be considered. These doctors
might be available to participate in the FMEA discus-
sions but their rotations would mean that they may not
be around to implement the new changes or teach them
to others and thus the FMEA may need to be repeated.
Recommendations
Practical recommendations for conducting an FMEA
have been extensively published including guidelines
about how to choose high risk topics, who should par-
ticipate in the FMEA meetings, how the meetings should
be conducted and even how to reach consensus with the
participating team [3,22-24]. Reviews related to the use
of FMEA in healthcare have all supported its application
in healthcare and have encouraged its use, indicating
that the Joint Commission in the USA, as well as several
other bodies, promote its use. There is no denying that
FMEA is a useful prospective tool that allows healthcare
professionals to discuss a process of care as a team.
However, the results of this study have indicated that
FMEA’s validity is questionable and thus the absolute
promotion of its use in healthcare may be inappropriate.
As Spath [25] (p.116) has stated:
‘One of the worst practices used in conducting FMEA
projects is to use only FMEA techniques to make a
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improving the safety of processes has some known
limitations.’
Following the results of this study and previous reli-
ability studies [2,3] it would not be appropriate to rec-
ommend the use of FMEA alone as a tool for preventing
patient harm. The benefits of gathering a multidisciplin-
ary team to discuss a process of care are clear; However,
organisations do not necessarily need to gather a team
with the goal of conducting ‘FMEA’. Identifying potential
failures is beneficial as it allows the team to share experi-
ences, yet as they are ‘potential failures’ there is no need
to translate these failures into numerical representatives
including severity, probability and detectability scores.
The scores might be useful to guide the team, but the
scores should not become the main focus of the process
where the aim of the FMEA becomes reducing the RPN
values rather than finding solutions to avoid failures or
errors from reaching the patient. Furthermore, focusing
the FMEA on reducing the RPN values may result in
bias results as participants’ focus shifts from patient
safety to lowering numerical values. It is also essential
that any changes or improvements should be recom-
mended while keeping in mind the feasibility and costs
of their implementation as well the resources and meth-
ods of evaluating their benefit or effects on patient
safety.
As this is the first study to evaluate the validity of
FMEA in healthcare, there is significant potential for fu-
ture studies to further explore each step of FMEAs val-
idity. Ideally future studies should explore criterion
validity of FMEA by collecting relevant objective data
and comparing it to those provided by the FMEA team
data. In addition to this, because FMEA data and out-
puts are not standard, the data collected could be tai-
lored for each specific FMEA, and thus the validity of
the outputs can be further tested or explored rather than
the FMEA process itself.
Conclusion
There are significant methodological challenges in valid-
ating FMEA. It is a useful tool to aid multidisciplinary
groups in mapping and understanding a process of care;
however, the results of our study cast doubt on its valid-
ity. FMEA teams are likely to need different sources of
information, besides their personal experiences and
knowledge, to identify potential failures. As for FMEA’s
methodology for scoring failures, there were discrepan-
cies between the teams’ estimates and similar incidents
reported on the trust’s incident database. Furthermore,
the concept of multiplying ordinal scales to prioritise
failures is mathematically flawed. Until FMEA’s validity
is further explored, healthcare organisations should notsolely depend on their FMEA results to prioritise patient
safety issues.
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